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Abstract
There is increasing evidence that people underestimate the magni-
tude of compounding interest. However, if people were aware of their
inability to make such calculations they should demand services to
ameliorate the consequences of such deficiencies. In a laboratory ex-
periment, we find that people exhibit substantial exponential-growth
bias but, more importantly, that they are overconfident in their ability
to answer questions that involve exponential growth. They also ex-
hibit overconfidence in their ability to use a spreadsheet to answer
these questions. This evidence explains why a market solution to
exponential-growth bias has not been forthcoming. Biased individ-
uals have suboptimally low demand for tools and services that could
improve their financial decisions.
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1 Introduction
Chess . . . was invented for the entertainment of a king who re-
garded it as a training in the art of war. The king was so de-
lighted with the game that he offered the inventor any reward he
chose to name. The latter said he only wished to have the amount
of corn resulting from placing one grain on the first square, two
on the second, and so on, doubling the number for each successive
square of the sixty-four. This sum, when calculated, showed a to-
tal number of grains expressed by no less than twenty figures, and
it became apparent that all the corn in the world would not equal
the amount desired. The king thereupon told the inventor that
his acuteness in devising such a wish was even more admirable
than his talent in inventing [chess]. — A.A. Macdonell, “The
Origin and Early History of Chess”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society, January 1898, 30(1): pp. 117–141.
Exponential-growth bias (EGB) refers to the systematic tendency to un-
derestimate compound growth processes (Stango and Zinman, 2009). The
passage above highlights the unintuitive difficulty in perceiving exponential
growth. But this misperception also implicates a second and equally impor-
tant error; the king is surprised by the magnitude of his misperception. We
refer to this mistake as overconfidence in exponential estimation, and it is
the focus of this paper.
Misperceptions of fundamental financial processes may at first seem to
lead to important inefficiencies. However, conventional economic thinking
suggests that a well-functioning market should solve this problem. In the
same way that people are not fully self-sufficient in modern society but
acquire most needs through markets, a person could in principle do the
same for their financial decisions. A financially unskilled agent could simply
outsource financial decisions to an expert, and a competitive market for
advice would eliminate the effect of EGB on financial decisions. But if
people are not self-aware of their misperceptions they will exhibit insufficient
demand for corrective tools and advice. Thus the presence of overconfidence
in exponential estimation is fundamental to the welfare relevance of EGB.
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In our experiment, subjects answer questions that involve exponential
growth and are paid based on their accuracy. They may obtain either
a spreadsheet or the true answer to improve their payment. We obtain
incentive-compatible measures of subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP) for
the spreadsheet and for the correct answer. A risk-averse subject who ex-
pects to lose x on a question relative to the maximal earnings should be
willing to pay at least x for the correct answer, and strictly more than x if
she is strictly risk-averse over the experimental stakes. Any disutility from
answering the questions without aid would further increase her WTP.
We find that subjects exhibit a high degree of EGB. We use the model
of Levy and Tasoff (2016) to parameterize the accuracy of subjects’ per-
ceptions as α, where α = 1 implies the person correctly perceives exponen-
tial growth and α = 0 implies that a person perceives exponential growth
as linear. The average α is 0.65 which is slightly higher than the distri-
bution in a representative sample of the population US (Levy and Tasoff,
2016) and represents unawareness of 2/3 of the impact of compounding.
Average performance earnings across the control group were $11.33. Given
that maximum earnings were $25, and the correct answer, barring trembles,
guarantees maximum earnings, the optimal average WTP should thus be
at least $13.67. Instead we find that the average WTP for the correct an-
swer is only $5.70. We construct a normalized measure of overconfidence
defined as (Optimal WTP − Actual WTP)/$25, where the Optimal WTP
is defined conservatively as the earnings-maximizing WTP ($25 − actual
earnings without help). This gives us a measure on [−1, 1] where 1 signifies
that the person earned $0 without help but believed he would earn the max-
imum, and -1 signifies that the person earned $25 without help but believed
he would earn $0. The mean overconfidence is 0.31, and 86% of subjects
exhibit overconfidence. Thus overconfidence may act as a significant damper
on the market’s ability to correct EGB through professional advice. More-
over we find evidence of “illusory superiority” (Kruger and Dunning, 1999),
as less skilled individuals — i.e. those with lower α — tend to be the most
overconfident. This suggests a pathological selection in the marketplace,
whereby the people who need help the most have the lowest demand for it.
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Given these findings, one may expect sub-optimally low demand for the
spreadsheet as well. Surprisingly, we find the reverse. The spreadsheet had
no significant positive impact on subject performance. Consequently, any
positive WTP for the spreadsheet indicates a different type of overconfi-
dence: overconfidence in one’s ability to use the spreadsheet. The average
WTP for the spreadsheet is $4.59, indicating an average overconfidence in
ability to use the spreadsheet of 0.165. We find that 75% of subjects in
the spreadsheet group have significant overconfidence in their ability to use
the spreadsheet. The experiment shows that people are willing to pay for
tools that do not in practice improve their performance. That is, not only
does this tool not improve performance, it lowers overall earnings because
subjects are willing to pay for it.
Recent work has shown that EGB is widespread and correlated with
important financial outcomes. Many psychology and economics papers, be-
ginning with Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975), have shown robust evidence for
EGB in the lab (Wagenaar and Timmers, 1979; Keren, 1983; Benzion, Gra-
not and Yagil, 1992; MacKinnon and Wearing, 1991; Eisenstein and Hoch,
2007; McKenzie and Liersch, 2011). Stango and Zinman (2009) use the
1977 and 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances and find that those with a
larger error on a question about interest rates have higher short-term debt
to income ratios, lower stock ownership as a percentage of portfolios, lower
savings rates, lower net worth, and no difference in long-term debt to income
ratios. Goda et al. (2015) measure EGB in a representative sample of the
US population and find that about one third are fully biased meaning that
they perceive compound interest as simple interest. They find that all else
equal, the un-biased type is associated with 40% more retirement savings at
retirement age than a fully biased type than a fully biased type, or $50,000
in absolute terms. It is therefore important to understand the mechanism
underpinning the correlation.
While the evidence is mostly correlational, there are reasons to believe
that some of these associations are causal in nature. First, theory predicts
that EGB can lead to sub-optimally low savings. The model of Stango and
Zinman (2009) predicts the correlations found in their empirical analysis,
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and the lifecycle-consumption model in Levy and Tasoff (2016) predicts that
biased people will likely undersave. Second, there is observational evidence
that a law designed to curb the negative effects of EGB heterogeneously
affected consumers as a function of their bias. Stango and Zinman (2011)
find that people who make larger errors on an interest rate question in the
Survey of Consumer Finances have higher APR’s on their personal loans
prior to mandated APR disclosure. Mandated disclosure then compressed
the interest rates on the loans of the relatively biased and unbiased peo-
ple. Regulation seems to have prevented firms from price-discriminating on
borrowers’ cognitive biases.
These associations require some explanation for why market solutions
have not eliminated the problem. This is the first paper to present evidence
that people are unaware of exponential-growth bias, and therefore exhibit
sub-optimally low demand for financial advice and tools that could improve
their financial decisions. Overconfidence is a widespread cognitive bias but
not universal. A common finding in the overconfidence literature is that
people tend to be overconfident on hard tasks but under-confident on easy
tasks (see Moore and Healy, 2008, for a discussion of the literature). Given
that both over- and underconfidence are observed depending on the task, it
is not at all obvious that people are overconfident about their exponential
estimation. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) find that confidence in financial
literacy tends to be high even in samples that have low actual literacy rates.
Souleles (2004), Puri and Robinson (2007), Hyytinen and Putkuri (2012)
find that people’s overoptimism predicts consumption, non-prudent finan-
cial behavior, and debt. Although these results are suggestive, the subjective
Likert measures used to measure overconfidence and overoptimism in these
studies are un-incentivized and cannot quantify magnitude due to the arbi-
trary scale of the Likert measures.1 Moreover, these measures are silent on
whether people are overconfident about their exponential estimation ability
per se, or about other features of financial decision-making.
The extent of demand for advice appears insufficient to eliminate a cor-
1The exception is Puri and Robinson (2007), who measure overoptimism by comparing
subjective life expectancy to actuarial projections.
4
relation between EGB and financial outcomes in cross-sectional analysis.
Given the pervasiveness of EGB, if consumers were aware of their inability
to evaluate financial products, there should be large demand for services and
tools that could help biased consumers to make sound financial decisions.
Although such services do exist it seems that consumer biases persist in the
unfettered marketplace (Stango and Zinman, 2011). Agency problems may
cause partial unraveling of advice markets. Mullainathan, Noeth and Schoar
(2012) find that investment advisors encourage clients to incur unnecessary
fees. But there is a supply of financial advisers that seem to offer sound hon-
est advice to help clients reduce their debt, obtain low-interest loans, and
save for retirement that appears to be free of significant agency problems.
For example, some investment management companies have incentives well-
aligned with their clients, and provide vast amounts of free guidance. The
low take-up of these services is a puzzle that this paper addresses.
The next section presents the experimental design. Section 3 contains
the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Design
This study was conducted through the Center for Neuroeconomic Studies
(CNS) at Claremont Graduate University on a sample of Claremont Col-
leges students in November and December 2011. There were 7 sessions and
we recruited a total of 96 subjects. Like all laboratory-based experiments
on university students, our results pertain to a potentially unrepresentative
sample. Previous research has demonstrated that EGB is widely prevalent
in the general population (Stango and Zinman, 2009; Levy and Tasoff, 2016;
Goda et al., 2015), but it is possible that students are more or less overcon-
fident. It was necessary to conduct the study under laboratory conditions
rather than using a representative online panel, however, in order to ex-
ercise control over subjects’ problem-solving resources. Subjects were not
provided with any tools, and calculators/cell phones were expressly forbid-
den. The experimenter routinely checked upon the subjects to ensure that
no one violated the rules. Time limits were not imposed for any part of
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the experiment. Most completed within 30-60 minutes. The design is a
controlled abstraction that allows for a clean measure of people’s expected
performance.
To measure EGB, subjects answered questions that involved exponen-
tial growth, and to measure overconfidence subjects stated their WTP for
a spreadsheet and for the answer, which could be purchased to improve
responses. Overconfidence is measured by taking the difference between
the WTP and the true value of the resource. The experiment began with
comprehensive instructions and examples as well as a comprehension check
that was necessary to correctly complete in order to proceed. The appendix
contains the instrument. Figures A1–A4 display the instructions.
Subjects faced a series of 32 questions relating the growth of two hypo-
thetical assets. The first asset’s value was occluded by computations that
included exponential growth, and the second asset always had a free variable
X. The subjects’ task was to estimate or compute the X that would make
both assets equal after the specified number of periods. Subjects were paid
based on the accuracy of a randomly-selected question.
Subjects were informed that one question would be chosen randomly by
computer, and that they would receive an incentive payment based on the
accuracy of their response to that question (in addition, subjects received a
show-up fee of $5.00). Subjects were informed of their payment on an exit
screen at the end of the experiment; other than this, subjects received no
feedback. The incentive payment used a quadratic scoring rule in accuracy,
bounded below by zero. That is, if a subject i responded rij to a question
on which the correct answer was cj , then their payment would be:
piij = max
25− 100 ·
(
1− rij
cj
)2
, 0
 (1)
Subjects were given examples of this payment rule in the instructions, and
were provided with a table of payments corresponding to different percentage
errors alongside every question (see Figure A2 for instance).
The 32 questions were divided across four domains, randomized first
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at the domain level and then within-domain. A list of all 32 questions
is given in Table A1. The domains comprised the exponential, periodic
savings domains, and fluctuating interest from Levy and Tasoff (2016), and
an additional front-end load domain. Questions took the form:
• Exponential: “Asset A has an initial value of $P , and grows at an
interest rate of i% each period. Asset B has an initial value equal to
$X, and does not grow. What $X will make the value of asset A and
B equal at the end of T periods?”
• Periodic savings: “At the beginning of each period, Asset A receives
a $c contribution. These contributions earn i% interest every period,
and Asset A includes both the contributions and the interest earned at
the end. Asset B returns a fixed amount of $X at the end. What value
of X will cause the two assets to be of equal value after T periods?
• Front-end load: “Asset A has an initial value of $PA, and grows at an
interest rate of iA% each period. Asset B has an initial value equal to
$X, and grows at an interest rate of iB% each period. What $X will
make the value of asset A and B equal at the end of T periods?”
• Fluctuating interest: “Asset A has an initial value of $PA, and grows
at an interest rate of iA1% in odd periods (starting with the first),
and at iA2% in even periods. Asset B has an initial value of $PB, and
grows at X% per period. What value of X will cause the two assets
to be of equal value after 20 periods?” In questions 29–32 (see Table
A1) Asset B also experienced a fluctuating interest rate.
The variety of domains serves two purposes. First, it better captures the
breadth of decisions that involve exponential growth in naturalistic envi-
ronments. Second, the variety of domains also represents a range of more
and less challenging questions. Whereas a spreadsheet may directly give the
solution to the exponential domain, a bit more thinking is necessary to use
it to solve the periodic-savings domain. This may make the value of the
spreadsheet more noisy, just as it would be in naturalistic environments.
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The experiment can be broken down into two phases. The design is pre-
sented in Figure 1. The purpose of the first phase was primarily to elicit
subjects’ WTP for the spreadsheet and the answer, but also recorded sub-
jects’ initial estimates of the value of an asset. Subjects indicated their WTP
to receive the use of a spreadsheet and their WTP for the correct answer,
on a question-by-question basis. The elicitation procedure was based on the
Becker-DeGroot-Marshack mechanism to maintain incentive compatibility.
Subjects were informed that with some exogenous probability, this mecha-
nism would determine their receipt of help. Otherwise, they would either
receive the correct answer, a spreadsheet, or no assistance on all questions
independently of their stated WTP.
A variety of features were used to ensure subject comprehension. The in-
structions explicitly stated that the earnings-maximizing strategy was to en-
ter the amount by which they expected having the correct answer would in-
crease their earnings if the question were chosen, i.e. $25−E
(
100 ·
(
1− rijcj
)2)
,
and were given examples of how under-bidding and over-bidding were dom-
inated strategies. Moreover, subjects could not proceed until they passed a
comprehension test. Subjects were asked what bid would maximize their ex-
pected earnings if they thought their answer with no help would earn $9.50.
Only once they correctly answered that a WTP of $15.50 would maximize
expected earnings were they allowed to exit the instructions and proceed to
the experiment. We would expect that, if anything, this would anchor their
stated willingness-to-pay at $15.50 if subjects interpreted this example as
containing information about their expected performance (this would have
biased behavior away from overconfidence).
In the first phase subjects also gave an initial un-incentivized estimate of
the value of the asset (see Figure A6). This was done to ensure they actively
considered the question when deciding on their WTP for help. We will focus
on subjects’ incentivized responses from the second phase in our empirical
analysis, but note that the initial responses may also be used to help measure
treatment effects (i.e. the impact of the spreadsheet on performance), with
the caveat that subjects understood these initial estimates would not count
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Figure 1: Experiment Design
Instructions and 
Consent Form
View all questions, 
initial (unincentivized) 
answers
WTP for 
spreadsheet, 
answer on each 
question
Unconditionally 
randomized to treatment
Control: answer all 
questions without tools 
Spreadsheet: use of 
spreadsheet randomly 
provided for subset of 
questions
Answer: correct answer 
randomly provided for 
subset of questions 
Incentive-Compatibility:  
spreadsheets or correct 
answers provided per 
BDM result 
Payment
Exit Survey
for payment.2
Prior to the second phase subjects were randomized into one of four treat-
ments. Subjects in the control group were given neither the spreadsheet nor
the correct answer, regardless of their WTP. Subjects in the spreadsheet
treatment were given the spreadsheet, regardless of their WTP. Two auxil-
iary treatments were also used. To verify that subjects would in fact earn full
payments when given the answers, a small number of subjects were allocated
to the answer treatment and given the correct answer on some — though not
all — questions, regardless of their WTP. Finally, to ensure strict incentive
compatibility for the WTP-elicitation task, some subjects were randomized
into the incentive-compatibility group and could purchase the spreadsheet
or the correct answer at a randomly-drawn price X if it was below their
indicated WTP, and receive no help and would not pay anything if X was
2An alternative design would have included incentivized, unaided questions for all
subjects as a measure of baseline ability, and then elicited WTP for help on a different set
of questions. In pilots, it was found that earnings varied considerably from question to
question — in the final sample, average performance earnings by question varied from $3.96
to $19.98 — and so a baseline assessment on separate questions was deemed uninformative.
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above their WTP.3 Which resource could be purchased was randomly as-
signed. Subjects then proceeded to give final responses to the 32 questions,
one of which would be selected for payment. Subjects who received help
on some questions first gave final answers to questions for which they did
not receive aid and then the questions for which they did. Subjects in the
IC group faced identical conditions to those in the control until the first
question for which they received help, when they could infer that they were
indeed in the IC group.
Observing both the un-aided responses and initial willingness-to-pay en-
ables us to calculate an index of overconfidence. What we would like to
calculate is the difference between subjects’ own expectations of their un-
aided earnings, and the rational expectation. The first ingredient, subjects’
own expectations of their unaided earnings, is embedded in their willingness-
to-pay: E(pij) = $25−WTPij , where pij denotes the earnings of subject i
on question j.4 To estimate the second ingredient, the “rational” expecta-
tion, our preferred method uses the earnings that would have resulted from
that subject’s actual response to a given question. While performance may
be unexpectedly high or low on any particular question, averaging across
all 32 questions will yield an unbiased estimate (if errors are uncorrelated)–
since actual performance is what rational expectations must predict. Our
overconfidence index is thus [[$25−WTPij ]− pij ] /25.5
The difficulty of a question will affect performance and could thereby
affect overconficence. Moore and Healy (2008) show that people tend to
3To avoid anchoring subjects’ responses, they were not informed of the distribution
from which X was drawn. In practice, a uniform distribution over the [0,25] interval was
used.
4This is a lower bound. Beliefs about earnings will be higher if subjects are risk-averse
or have a disutility from effort from answering the questions.
5For example, consider someone who (correctly) expected to earn $5 half of the time
and $25 half of the time, for $15 on average, and stated a WTP on every question of $15.
We would characterize the person as “overconfident” by $10 on the half of questions where
she only earned $5, as “underconfident” on the half of questions where they earned $25,
and overall as neither under- nor overconfident. As defined, overconfidence is bounded as
a function of a person’s performance. A person who answered perfectly on every ques-
tion , and is thus revealed to be maximally competent could not exhibit overconfidence.
Similarly, a person who earned $0 on every question could not exhibit underconfidence.
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overestimate their performance on difficult tasks and underestimate their
performance on easy tasks. Therefore the degree of overconfidence measured
in this paper might not reflect the degree of overconfidence found in the mar-
ket. However, there is good reason to believe that the questions we use are
a good deal easier than the typical and important financial decisions that
consumers face thereby understating market overconfidence. Real-world de-
cisions such as retirement savings, debt repayment, and portfolio choice
all require multiple steps, multiple time horizons, and the incorporation of
risk and uncertainty. Moreover, the extent to which the presentation of
the problems in this experiment was unfamiliar to subjects should increase
rather than decrease their WTP out of insurance motives.
The existence and randomization into the four treatment groups was
clearly explained to subjects prior to the WTP elicitation task, although the
probability of assignment into each treatment was not stated. The control
group allowed for measuring performance, without help, on a random sample
(i.e. without selecting those least willing to pay for help). The spreadsheet
group served the same purpose, measuring performance with a spreadsheet
on a random sample. These two groups are the focus of our analysis. The
“answer” group was included to demonstrate that subjects could indeed use
the correct answer if it were provided. Finally, the IC group was included so
that subjects faced strict incentives to truthfully report their WTP in the
first phase of the experiment. Because the IC were more likely to receive
assistance on questions for which they had a greater demand, we exclude
this self-selected sample from the main analysis.
The spreadsheet used was a custom application that was integrated into
the experimental interface. It had cells and allowed for all arithmetic cal-
culations needed to compute the correct answer and a user interface similar
to Microsoft Excel, although it was based on an open-source alternative.
Subjects were not given access to the spreadsheet before expressing their
WTP. Practice computations could have primed subjects, especially if those
practice computations involved expressions with exponentiation. The cost
of avoiding such bias is that expectations about the utility of the spread-
sheet are less well controlled. For this reason, overconfidence regarding the
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spreadsheet may be considered a secondary analysis, and the focus of this
paper is squarely on overconfidence regarding the correct answer.
There were 52 subjects who were assigned to the control group. The
spreadsheet treatment had 38 subjects, and the answer group had 2 sub-
jects.6 The remaining 4 subjects were assigned to the incentive-compatibility
group. We drop 4 subjects in the control and 2 subjects in the spreadsheet
group who had answers that did not allow for a convergent estimation of
exponential-growth perception α leaving 48 in the control and 36 in the
spreadsheet treatment; all results on overconfidence are robust to their in-
clusion.
At the end of the experiment there was a brief exit survey. Subjects
were asked if they had, “taken at least 2 advanced math courses in college”,
“personally own stocks, bonds, or mutual fund shares”, “use a credit card,
but pay the balance in full each month”, “use a credit card, but do not pay
the balance in full each month”, “am a current smoker”, and “none of the
above”.
3 Results
3.1 Exponential-Growth Bias
We first confirm that subjects are systematically biased in the direction pre-
dicted by exponential-growth bias. Figure 2 plots the distribution of log
errors at the question×subject and subject level for each of the 48 subjects’
responses to each of the 32 questions. We are left with 1481 subject-question
observations after dropping questions that subjects left blank. In panel
(a), where under-estimation is predicted by EGB, the median at the ques-
tion level (-0.34) and at the subject level (-0.42) are significantly negative
(p<0.01), and in panel (b) where over-estimation is predicted the median
6The purpose of the answer group was to address the potential concern that subjects
might not be competent to copy the answers into the response box. Ex ante we believed
this highly unlikely. Hence we reserved as much of the subject pool as possible for the
control and spreadsheet groups, treating the answer group as a nod toward common sense
rather than formal statistical testing.
12
at the question level (0.19) and subject level (0.25) are significantly positive
(p<0.01). The means are similarly significant (p<0.01), confirming that
subjects’ responses are systematically biased in the direction predicted by
the theory.
Figure 2: Mistakes
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Notes: Underestimation on questions where EGB predicts a downward-biased answer
(Panel a); overestimation on those where an upward bias is predicted (Panel b). The dis-
tribution of errors in predicted asset growth should be symmetric about zero if subjects’
errors on a percentage basis are symmetric about zero. The means of all distributions
are significantly different from zero at both the question and subject levels (p < 0.01)
We next use each subject’s combined responses to estimate an individual-
level degree of EGB corresponding to α in Levy and Tasoff (2016), where
α = 0 constitutes the fully-biased type and α = 1 the fully rational type, and
values of α ∈ (0, 1) constitute intermediate levels of bias. More specifically,
an EGB agent of degree α mis-perceives the period-T value of $1 invested
at t and growing according to a vector of interest rates ~i as: p(i, t;α) =∏T−1
s=t (1 + αis) +
∑T−1
s=t (1− α)is. We estimate for each subject the α which
minimizes the sum of squared errors between their actual responses and the
responses predicted for someone with degree α of EGB. We then compare
the distribution of bias in our student sample to the general population
in Figure 3. Subjects in the control group of our student sample had more
accurate perceptions than representative samples of the US population (Levy
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and Tasoff, 2016; Goda et al., 2015). The mean α for the students is 0.65
with a median of 0.71 compared to 0.60 and 0.53 for the representative
sample. Only 16% of our student sample is fully biased, in contrast to
33% in representative US samples. Overall, the students outperformed the
representative sample despite the fact that the representative sample was
allowed to use tools and get help and the student control-group sample was
not.
Figure 3: CDF of Alpha
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
CD
F
0 .25 .5 .75 1
Alpha
Representative Sample Laboratory Sample
Notes: Cumulative distribution of EGB (α = 0 is full-bias, α = 1 no-bias). Laboratory
sample estimates subject-level parameter for control subjects using all 32 questions.
Representative sample is from Levy and Tasoff (2016)
3.2 Overconfidence in Exponential Estimation
Our main results establish that subjects overestimated both their accuracy
and their precision. We begin by demonstrating that subjects systematically
stated a willingness to pay for the correct answer that was below the ex-post
optimal level. We then show that the elicited WTP measures are too low to
be justified by the observed level of precision.
3.2.1 Main Results
Table 1 shows subjects’ performance and demand for answers and the spread-
sheet by treatment. The first column includes all observations in the control
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condition, while the second column includes all observations in the spread-
sheet treatment.
Table 1: Behavior by Treatment
Control Spreadsheet Difference
(1) (2) (3)
First-pass Hypothetical Earnings 7.886 6.860 -1.026∗
(9.741) (9.393) [0.554]
Performance Earnings 11.33 11.47 0.140
(10.24) (10.68) [1.101]
Performance − First-pass Earnings 3.439 4.606 1.166
(12.93) (12.56) [0.939]
WTP Answer 5.699 5.451 -0.248
(4.511) (3.998) [0.762]
WTP Spreadsheet 4.517 4.587 0.070
(4.270) (4.067) [0.742]
α 0.652 0.750 0.098
(0.444) (0.518) [0.108]
N 1471 1144
Subjects 48 36
Notes: “First-Pass Hypothetical Earnings” is earnings if the first-pass answer counted for pay.
“Difference” columns show treatment group minus control group. “Spreadsheet” columns
include all observations in the spreadsheet treatment in which the subject got the spreadsheet.
Standard deviations in parentheses and robust standard errors clustered by subject in square
brackets. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
The first row shows what the earnings would have been if the (unincen-
tivized) first-pass responses were used for payment. For these questions sub-
jects in all groups faced identical tasks. Thus one should expect that behav-
ior here is the same across treatments. We use this as a proxy of ability and
engagement with the task, though with the caveat that subjects knew their
answers here would not count for payment. Control hypothetical earnings on
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average would have been $7.89. The spreadsheet group performed slightly
worse with hypothetical earnings at $6.86. To test the difference between
the groups we run an OLS regression of the outcome variable on a dummy
for the two non-control groups clustering the standard errors by subject.
The spreadsheet group does seem to do slightly worse by chance (p=0.07).
The second row displays performance earnings that subjects would earn if
a given question were selected for payment The control group earns $11.33.
The spreadsheet group only earns $0.14 more and it is not significantly dif-
ferent from the control earnings. This indicates that the spreadsheets had
no significant impact on performance. The third row shows the difference
between subjects’ earnings from their final answer (ignoring any price paid
for the spreadsheet or answer) and the earnings that would have resulted
from their first-pass answers. Subjects in both the control and spreadsheet
groups significantly improved their second, incentivized, responses relative
to their initial responses. The third column indicates that the extent of
improvement was greater for subjects who received spreadsheets than those
who did not but the difference is not statistically significant.
The mean WTP for the correct answer was only $5.70 in the control and
$5.45 in the spreadsheet group, indicating overconfidence. Mean WTP for
the spreadsheet was $4.52 in the control group, indicating overconfidence in
ability to use the spreadsheet given that the actual value of the spreadsheet
was not statistically different than zero. Mean WTP for the spreadsheet in
the other groups is not statistically different than the control group.
The last row in Table 1 shows the parametric estimate of subjects’ de-
gree of EGB, α. Subjects in the spreadsheet treatment displayed an average
value of 0.75. This is higher than the 0.65 among controls, suggesting that
the spreadsheet may have had some impact (particularly among those close
to the correct answer, where earnings are relatively flat), although the dif-
ference is not significant.
The two subjects in the answer treatment are sufficient to quickly ver-
ify that subjects understood the task well enough to exploit the provided
answers, although apparently not well enough to exclude some trembles (12
of the 14 observations achieved maximal earnings of $25, and the average
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was $24.57). Next we calculate overconfidence in exponential estimation, for
every question in the control group, using the payment that a subject would
have earned had that question been chosen for implementation according to
the quadratic payment rule given by (1). Subjects answering exactly cor-
rectly would have an associated payment of $25, while responses more than
50% from the correct answer would receive zero. The average associated
payment across all 1481 subject-question pairs was $11.28 (s.d. 10.25). If
agents were risk-neutral over $25 stakes, then the optimal strategy would be
to state a willingness to pay for the correct answer ofWTPij = $25−E(pij).
Any concavity in utility would set this as a lower bound, as paying for the
correct answer can be viewed as providing insurance for the earnings. Like-
wise, if subjects experience disutility from doing math then they should
exhibit higher demand for the correct answer, and again this measure would
be a lower bound for overconfidence. A simple test of whether subjects ac-
curately predicted their performance is to compare the actual willingness to
pay against this bound. Subjects may under- or over-pay on some questions,
but by the law of large numbers the average willingness to pay across all
questions should converge to ($25− p¯) = $13.72. Instead, the mean will-
ingness to pay is significantly lower at $5.76 (p<0.01). That is, subjects on
average expect their answers to earn at least 40% more than they actually
do.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 plots the distribution of overconfidence at the
subject×question level. The depicted variable is the difference between the
ex-post ‘optimal’ WTP (i.e. $25 less the actual associated payment) and the
stated willingness to pay for the answer, normalized by $25. Thus a value
of 1 indicates that a subject would pay $0 for an answer to a question on
which they would have earned no payment, and a value of -1 indicates that a
subject would pay $25 for an answer to a question on which they would have
earned the full payment. This variable should be distributed about zero if
subjects are risk-neutral, or some negative number if they are risk-averse.
Instead, the distribution has a positive mean (0.318), and is skewed highly
positive.
The second panel of Figure 4 helps establish that this result is driven
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by a large fraction of subjects being systematically overconfident across all
questions. Panel (b) computes the mean of the under-payment variable from
panel (a) at the subject level, and plots the distribution of this subject-level
outcome. A subject who over-pays on some questions but under-pays on
others would of course converge towards zero as we average over a large
number of questions. Instead we find that both the mean (0.31) and median
(0.28) are significantly overconfident (p<0.01), with 86% of subjects exhibit-
ing positive overconfidence. This result thus also rules out an alternative
hypothesis, that subjects correctly perceive the average ability but are un-
aware of their own. If that were the case, the subject-level overconfidence
would again be symmetrically distributed around zero (those who are better
than average being characterized as underconfident and vice-versa), which
we reject.
Figure 4: Overconfidence — Underpayment for the Correct Answer
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Notes: “Optimal WTP” is defined as $25 less a subject’s actual earnings on a question,
and is therefore ex post optimal. Panel (a) shows the distribution of under-payment,
and the mass weighted by the squared error should be equal on either side of 0 in the
absence of systematic bias (or about some negative amount if subjects are risk-averse
over $25 stakes). Panel (b) computes mean under-payment at the subject level, and
should converge to a point mass at zero in the absence of systematic bias (or a mass at
some negative amount if subjects are risk-averse).
In Table 2, we explore the predictors of overconfidence. In column (2),
we see that subjects who have taken advanced math courses and who person-
ally owned stocks were significantly less overconfident (the effect decomposes
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Table 2: Overconfidence — Underpayment for Correct Answer
(1) (2) (3) (6)
Constant 0.319*** 0.442*** 0.435*** 0.559***
(0.034) (0.102) (0.054) (0.113)
Has Taken Adv. Math -0.192** -0.181**
(0.092) (0.084)
Owns Stocks -0.138* -0.117
(0.078) (0.080)
No Credit Card Balances -0.083 -0.100
(0.097) (0.094)
Smoker 0.031 0.063
(0.108) (0.097)
Alpha -0.177*** -0.174***
(0.065) (0.058)
N 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,471
Subjects 48 48 48 48
Notes: Dependent variable is question-level ex post overconfidence, defined as (25 − pij −
WTPij)/25 . Alpha represents the degree of the subject’s accuracy at exponential questions.
Standard errors clustered by subject. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Figure 5: Subject-level Overconfidence as a Function of α
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roughly half into higher earnings and half into higher WTP). A causal in-
terpretation of this result is that experience with these calculations, be it
through math courses or participation in the stock market, leads to better
performance and greater self-awareness about one’s errors. Alternatively,
those who have an innate talent for math will be better at exponential ques-
tions as well as more aware of their own limitations and will be more likely
to take advanced math classes and participate in the stock market. We
focus on columns (3) and (4), which examine the relationship between the
severity of a subject’s EGB and his level of overconfidence. It is a common
finding in the overconfidence literature that the most error-prone subjects
are the most overconfident, and we find a similar pattern in our setting.7 is
not tautological that higher performers will have less overconfidence, as it
is possible that those making the largest errors are self-awareor even pes-
simistic and choose a WTP weakly above the optimum, while those with
the least errors believe they are perfect and choose a too-high WTP. We
find that a fully-biased subject has a 13–14 percentage point greater level of
overconfidence than an unbiased subject.
Figure 5 displays this visually, plotting subject-level average overcon-
fidence against α. There is a clear pattern: more biased individuals are
also more overconfident. This suggests a pathological selection in the mar-
ket, whereby the least competent avoid advice the most. This reduces the
incentives for market actors to correct the bias.
3.2.2 Unawareness vs. Overprecision
We next ask whether the overconfidence we observe comes only from the re-
quirement that subjects cannot be aware of their systematic bias, or whether
they are also overconfident about the precision of their errors even condi-
tional on there being no systematic error. A subject who is not systemati-
cally biased in her responses, but nevertheless knows they sometimes over-
estimate and sometimes under-estimate, should have a positive willingness-
to-pay for the correct answer. If subjects overestimate not only their accu-
7 While the bounds of overconfidence are a function of performance, it
21
racy but also their precision (Moore and Healy, 2008), then this will further
reduce their already too-low WTP for aid.
We make the following parametric assumptions for this exercise. Suppose
subject i believes that his response to question j, rij , is noisy. That is
rij = (bi+ηij)·cj , where cj is the correct response and ηij is drawn i.i.d. from
an exponential distribution: Fη(y) = 1 − e−λy. Here bi represents their
perceived degree of bias. An agent believing himself to be unbiased must
have expectations E[rij ] = cj , and therefore E[b+η] = 1. Given that E[η] =
1/λ for an exponential distribution, this is equivalent to the restriction b =
1−1/λ. This rational expectations condition on b does not hold for a biased
agent. Given the multiplicative structure, however, we can estimate the λ
parameter from the variance of rij/cj without having to estimate b, since
V ar[r/c] = V ar[η] = 1/λ2. The mean value across all subjects for 1/λ is
1.07. We can then simulate the subject’s earnings under the counter-factual
restriction that ηij is still exponentially distributed according to λi, but
imposing the restriction that b = 1 − 1/λi to simulate an unbiased agent
with the same noise as the biased agent.
We perform this simulation exercise separately for questions on which
exponential-growth bias predicts a positive and a negative bias. In both
cases, the simulated responses are associated with higher earnings than sub-
jects’ actual answers: $13.87 (s.d. 0.23) and $14.23 (s.d. 0.38), respectively,
as compared to actual means of $10.93 and $12.28. Subjects who were aware
of the noise in their answers, but not the systematic bias, therefore ought
to have a willingness to pay for the correct answer of between $10.77 and
$11.13 (or more if risk-averse). This is still significantly above the observed
willingness to pay of our subjects, which indicates that they must be overop-
timistic about the precision of their answers in addition to being unaware of
their bias. Indeed, the low willingness to pay is rationalized only if the vari-
ance of ηi is one-quarter of its true value, suggesting that subjects greatly
overestimated their precision in addition to their accuracy.
It is possible that subjects’ poor calibration may be due to a lack of
experience with these tasks. However, this cannot explain the systematic
downward bias in people’s WTP for the answer. In subjective expected
22
utility theory, a person must have a prior distribution for her earnings. A
lack of experience should lead to a more diffuse prior (i.e. mean-preserving
spread). This implies that not getting the answer is more risky. An agent
who is risk-averse should therefore increase her valuation of the answer as
her prior becomes more diffuse. Thus lack of experience should result in
the exact opposite result — a WTP that is above the optimal WTP. If one
instead modeled the setting as ambiguous, so that subjects did not have a
single well-defined prior, the prediction remains the same: less experience
implies more ambiguity, which should also increase the WTP for the correct
answer.
3.3 Overconfidence in Being Able to Use a Spreadsheet
Subjects were overconfident with their answers and they were also overconfi-
dent in their ability to use a spreadsheet. Receiving the spreadsheet had no
effect on their errors. If the spreadsheet group had indeed paid their WTP
for the spreadsheet, their earnings averaged over all questions would have
been $5.40 (p=0.003) less than the control group’s earnings.
Figure 6 displays the joint distribution of the WTP for the answer and
the WTP for the spreadsheet. As one can see, the WTP for the answer
almost always weakly exceeds the WTP for the spreadsheet. There is con-
siderable mass where WTP for the two are equal, 46.7% in the control group
and 44.4% in the full sample. This implies that on close to half of questions,
subjects believe that getting a spreadsheet is just as good as getting the cor-
rect answer. This indicates confidence in one’s ability to use the spreadsheet
effectively and no perceived cost or inconvenience.
We next measure overconfidence in being able to use a spreadsheet. Un-
like the general overconfidence measure we found in the previous section, we
cannot measure overconfidence in spreadsheet ability on a within-subject
basis. The performance under the counterfactual that a subject receives the
correct answer is approximately the maximal possible earnings $25. Here,
though, we have two possible approaches given the between-subjects design.
We can predict counterfactual earnings of subjects in the spreadsheet group
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Figure 6: WTP for Spreadsheet vs WTP for Answer
had they not had access to the spreadsheet, and counterfactual earnings for
the control group had they had access.8 In both cases, we predict perfor-
mance on the question level using the regression
PEij = β0 + β1FPHEij + β2FPHE2ij + δ · qj + eij . (2)
The outcome variable is the performance earnings (what the subject would
have earned if the question were selected to count) for individual i on ques-
tion j. FPHEij is the first-pass hypothetical earnings discussed above and
FPHE2ij is the square of this term. Question dummies are in the vector qj ,
and eij is the error term. We estimate the coefficients using one group, and
use the coefficients to predict counterfactual earnings for the other group.
The predictive models perform well, F(33, 48)=24.81, r2 = 0.240 among
controls and F(33,36) = 90.52, r2 = 0.178 among the spreadsheet group.
First, we predict performance earnings for the spreadsheet treatment,
under the counterfactual that they did not get the spreadsheet. The differ-
8A third approach would be to use treated subjects’ unincentivized estimates to esti-
mate within-subject treatment effects of the spreadsheet. It is undesirable to use these
responses directly, however, as they are unincentivized and, in general, are associated with
substantially lower earnings than final answers.
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ence between earnings with the spreadsheet and predicted earnings without
the spreadsheet is our estimate for the value of the spreadsheet. We define
overconfidence in being able to use the spreadsheet as as the WTP minus
the estimated value of getting the spreadsheet, divided by $25: (WTP- Pre-
dicted Gain)/$25. Thus if the person values the spreadsheet at $25 but the
benefit was 0 then overconfidence is 1, and if the person values the spread-
sheet at $0 but its benefit is $25 then overconfidence is -1. If the spreadsheet
hurts performance then values of overconfidence greater than 1 are possible.
Second, we predict performance earnings for control subjects under the
counterfactual that they did have access to the spreadsheet. Again we es-
timate equation (2), this time using the spreadsheet group, and use the
coefficients to predict earnings for control subjects. The estimated value
of the spreadsheet for controls is their counterfactual performance earnings
with the spreadsheet, minus their actual earnings. Overconfidence is again
defined as subjects’ WTP minus the estimated value of the spreadsheet,
divided by $25.
Figure 7 panel (a) shows the distribution of overconfidence in being able
to use a spreadsheet using both approaches (i.e. counterfactuals for the
spreadsheet sample and the control sample). We restrict attention to the in-
terval [-1,1].9 The mean estimated spreadsheet overconfidence in the spread-
sheet sample is 0.198 with 62.2% of responses exhibiting overconfidence.
This is significantly different from zero (clustered standard errors, p=0.001).
The mean estimated spreadsheet overconfidence in the control sample is
0.178 with 57.63% of responses exhibiting overconfidence. A Mann-Whitney
test fails to reject equality of the two distributions (p=0.35), providing reas-
surance that the two methods are indeed measuring the same thing. Panel
(b) shows subject level overconfidence. The population is significantly over-
confident (clustered standard errors, p<0.001 for both samples) with 70.3%
and 74.5% exhibiting overconfidence on average. A Mann-Whitney test
again does not reject equality of the distributions (p=0.75).
Overconfidence in exponential estimation conceptually differs from over-
9This includes 97.9% of the sample. The remaining 2.1% have overconfidence greater
than 1 implying a prediction the spreadsheet may have hurt their performance.
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Figure 7: Overconfidence In Using the Spreadsheet
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confidence in being able to use the spreadsheet. The former measures the
gap between the expected performance and actual performance, whereas the
latter measures the gap between the expected value added of the spreadsheet
and the actual value added. A person who has α = 1 could not be overcon-
fident in exponential estimation, but would necessarily have overconfidence
in being able to use the spreadsheet if she had a strictly positive valuation
for it.
An alternative explanation is that, if people believe that the spreadsheet
reduces the amount of effort involved in making calculations, then they may
pay for the spreadsheet to reduce effort even if it does not improve earnings.
If this motivation is true, then it would apply even more when paying for
the answer, yet there we find that people significantly underpay — that is,
our estimates of overconfidence there would be understated. Thus if people
are not truly overconfident in their spreadsheet ability because they use it
to avoid effort, then they must be even more overconfident about their raw
performance.
Since the spreadsheet was a customized feature of the interface, it may be
that subjects expected the common software application Microsoft Excel and
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were upset when they found an open-source application. This may explain
why subjects had a highWTP. This seems unlikely given that the application
could be used straightforwardly to answer all the exponential questions in
the same method used for Microsoft Excel. Nonetheless, we cannot fully
eliminate the possibility that subjects expected a different application and
were discouraged when they saw the open-source application.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
A growing literature has shown that EGB is a prevalent phenomenon. This
does not imply that there is a market failure. Just as the inability to make
finely crafted widgets does not preclude one from obtaining them in a com-
petitive marketplace, EGB should not preclude individuals from obtaining
the advice or tools to make good financial decisions. A second error is nec-
essary for this to happen. Agents who are overconfident in their exponen-
tial estimation will exhibit sub-optimally low demand for such advice and
tools. Our laboratory sample exhibited high degrees of EGB and overconfi-
dence. While subjects believed that they earned at least $19.24 on average,
they actually only earned $11.28. Individuals with greater EGB exhibited
greater overconfidence. This suggests pathological selection in the market-
place. Those who would benefit the most from advice or tools have lower
demand for these things. Ironically, subjects exhibit too much demand for
a spreadsheet that does not help them. The average WTP for the spread-
sheet in the full sample is $5.78 yet it had no statistically significant impact
on performance. The provision of costly tools that require significant skill
to use effectively could have easily made the vast majority of our subjects
worse off.
EGB is conceptually related to broader concepts of financial literacy.
Hung et al. (2009), reviewing the literature, define financial literacy as the
“knowledge of basic economic and financial concepts, as well as the ability
to use that knowledge and other financial skills to manage financial re-
sources effectively for a lifetime of financial well-being.” According to the
definition, comprehension and ability to compute compounding is certainly
27
a component of financial literacy. Perhaps the most common measurement
is the 3-question inventory developed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2009). It
includes simple questions on interest rates (not about compounding), on in-
flation, and on diversification. Almenberg and Gerdes (2012) find that EGB
is associated with broader measurements of financial literacy. Goda et al.
(2015) show that EGB predicts retirement savings while controlling for 3-
question inventory of financial literacy, IQ, education, time preferences, risk
preferences, and many standard controls. Investment firms often remind
consumers about the power of compound growth to increase their savings.
Overconfidence about EGB in particular is thus likely to be important and
require specifically designed policy interventions.
A possible countervailing force against consumer overconfidence is firms’
profit motive. A common argument against the persistence of biases in
the marketplace is that firms will inform consumers about their biases in
order to sell them advice or financial tools. To the contrary, firms may have
incentives to keep consumers ignorant. For example, a lender may wish to
keep her clients biased so that they underestimate the costs of a loan. But
a classic pro-market argument states that an honest firm could undercut
the deceptive firms by informing consumers. Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
show that this need not be the case. When there are “shrouded” add-on
goods, firms will not de-bias consumers in equilibrium because it would
cause them to earn strictly lower profits. Similarly, Heidhues, Kőszegi and
Murooka (2016) show that firms may deceive naive consumers about socially
wasteful products in equilibrium. Thus if people are overconfident in their
exponential estimation, firms may have little incentive to de-bias them and
much incentive to sustain the bias. The exploitative lender loses its ability
to exploit by informing clients, and providing information will not attract
more clients if exploitative competitors subsidize informed clients using the
extra revenue generated from exploiting the biased clients.
Our results and those in the literature lead us to question whether ad
hoc interventions can ameliorate confusing choice architectures. We show
that providing costly but perfect solutions will not work because people
have insufficient demand, and that providing costly tools that require skill
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may make people worse off. Ambuehl, Bernheim and Lusardi (2014) further
show that educational interventions can change behavior but still fail to
improve welfare. Perhaps a more promising approach to address EGB is
to design choice architectures that make it irrelevant. Explicit statements
about the time it takes to pay off a loan, or the amount of retirement income
generated from savings as in Goda, Manchester and Sojourner (2014) are
steps in this direction. Similarly, Royal and Tasoff (2014) show that if
tools are a complement with ability (tools are more valuable to high ability
people), not only will overconfident people exhibit overly high demand for
the tools, but the mere opportunity to obtain tools can induce more over-
entry into skilled tasks thus making them strictly worse off. In the context
of EGB, spreadsheets and other financial software may induce over-entry
into tasks that require computation of exponential growth such as active
trading and speculative real-estate investment. However, this remains an
open question.
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5 Appendix
Table A1: Experiment Questions
Domain Question Asset A: T Asset B: T Asset A: P0 Asset B: P0 Asset A: i Asset B: i
Exponential
1 10 10 100 X 10% 0%
2 20 20 200 X 5% 0%
3 10 10 90 X 25% 0%
4 35 35 30 X 7% 0%
5 30 30 120 X 4% 0%
6 10 10 500 X -8% 0%
7 20 20 1000 X -4% 0%
8 8 8 1000 X -15% 0%
Periodic Savings
9 30 30 +10/period X 5% 0%
10 30 30 +15/period X 2.5% 0%
11 20 20 +12/period X 10% 0%
12 20 20 +20/period X 5% 0%
13 15 15 +20/period X 6% 0%
14 20 20 +20/period X 6% 0%
15 25 25 +4/period X 5% 0%
16 50 50 +6/period X 5% 0%
Front-end Load
17 25 25 100 X 5% 8%
18 25 25 100 X 5% 10%
19 20 20 100 X 10% 13%
20 10 10 200 X 10% 20%
21 25 25 40 X 8% 5%
22 25 25 100 X 8% 5%
23 20 20 50 X 13% 10%
24 30 30 100 X 5% 4%
Fluctuating i
25 10 10 100 100 40% in odd; 0% in even X%
26 14 14 50 50 30% in odd; 0% in even X%
27 10 10 100 100 50% in odd; 0% in even X%
28 6 6 50 50 100% in odd; 0% in even X%
29 20 20 100 100 10% -20% in odd; X% in even
30 6 6 300 100 0% -40% in odd; X% in even
31 30 30 30 30 10% -10% in odd; X% in even
32 20 20 20 20 20% -20% in odd; X% in even
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Figure A1: Payment Instructions
Logged in as PGw689z.
Logout
This portion of the experiment is divided into 32 independent questions. Each question will
describe one or more financial asset, and ask you about their value over time.
The values of the assets will be calculated according to the description in the questions. Your
payment will be dependent on the accuracy of your response according to the quadratic equation,
payment= , where  is your response and  is the correct value. All negative
payments will be treated as zero.
Your payment is maximized when your response equals the correct value, . Below is a graph
that explains your payments as a function of accuracy.
This formula gives the exact way we will calculate your earnings, but it may be useful to think
about a few examples. For your reference:
If your answer is this far from the correct value, then you will earn:
0% $25.00
5% $24.75
10% $24.00
15% $22.75
20% $21.00
25% $18.75
30% $16.00
35% $12.75
25 − 100(1 − rv )2 r v
r = v
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Figure A2: Payment Instructions, continued
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This formula gives the exact way we will calculate your earnings, but it may be useful to think about a
few examples. For your reference:
If your answer is this far from the correct value, then you will earn:
0% $25.00
5% $24.75
10% $24.00
15% $22.75
20% $21.00
25% $18.75
30% $16.00
35% $12.75
40% $9.00
45% $4.75
50% or more $0.00
Example 1:
Asset A is worth . Asset B is worth $X. What value of X makes Asset A and Asset B
worth the same amount?
The true value of this Asset A is $410.
Suppose Leia states that X is $410. Then Leia will earn $25 if this question is selected.
However, Chewy states that X is $390. Then Chewy will earn 
 if this question is selected.
If Chewy had stated it is worth $300 he would have only earned 
.
If Chewy had stated that it is $700 then he would have earned $0 because 
.
In this example, how much would an answer of $800 have earned?
Continue
$100 + 330 − 20
25 − 100(1 − = $24.76390410 )2
25 − 100(1 − = $17.80300410 )2
25 − 100(1 − < 0700410 )2
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Figure A3: Treatment Instructions
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First Phase
There are two phases in the experiment. In the first phase you will face a series of questions about
the values or interest rates of assets. For each question you will be asked for three responses: your
initial estimate, and the maximum you are willing to pay for each of two services that may be
available in the second phase. In the second phase you will answer all the questions a second time
but possibly with the assistance of one of the aforementioned services.
The first service is a spreadsheet capable of basic arithmetic, exponentiation, and summation. The
second service will provide you with the correct answer directly. Both of these services may help
you in calculating the value of the asset for questions in the second phase, thereby increasing your
expected earnings.
You will be asked to state the maximum you are willing to pay (cutoff) for each of these two
services on every question. On any given question in the second phase, you may ultimately receive
either the spreadsheet or the correct answer, or neither, but never both.
After you provide an answer, and state your cutoffs for each service on each question, you will
begin the second phase.
Second Phase
In the second phase you will answer the exact same questions a second time possibly with the help
of a service. You will be randomly assigned to one of three possible tracks which determine the
service you receive and how you receive it.
Track A: Whether you receive one of these services and how much you pay for it is
determined in the following manner. For a given question, we will first randomly determine
which service is available. We will then randomly determine a price p for that service that is
independent of your stated cutoff. In other words, your stated cutoff will have no effect on
the random price. However, it will determine whether you purchase the service or not. If p is
equal to or above your stated cutoff (p ≥ cutoff) then you will not get the service. If p is less
than your stated cutoff (p < cutoff) then you will get the service for that question. At the end
of the experiment, you will pay $p (subtracted from your final earnings although you will
always earn at least $5 for participation) if and only if that particular question is selected for
payment. This procedure is then repeated to determine which service you get for every
question.
To maximize your expected earnings you should estimate how much each service would
improve your earnings and then state that as your cutoff. If the price p is then less than
your estimate, you will get the service and will expect to earn more money in total by buying
the service. If the price p is greater than your estimate, you will not buy the service which is
a good thing because you believe the service would cost more than it earns you (meaning
your total earnings would be lower if you had bought it).
Track B: you will receive one of the two services for free on all questions.
Track C: you will not receive any of the services nor will you pay for them.
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Second Phase
In the second phase you will answer the exact same questions a second time possibly with the help
of a service. You will be randomly assigned to one of three possible tracks which determine the
service you receive and how you receive it.
Track A: Whether you receive one of these services and how much you pay for it is
determined in the following manner. For a given question, we will first randomly determine
which service is available. We will then randomly determine a price p for that service that is
independent of your stated cutoff. In other words, your stated cutoff will have no effect on
the random price. However, it will determine whether you purchase the service or not. If p is
equal to or above your stated cutoff (p ≥ cutoff) then you will not get the service. If p is less
than your stated cutoff (p < cutoff) then you will get the service for that question. At the end
of the experiment, you will pay $p (subtracted from your final earnings although you will
always earn at least $5 for participation) if and only if that particular question is selected for
payment. This procedure is then repeated to determine which service you get for every
question.
To maximize your expected earnings you should estimate how much each service would
improve your earnings and then state that as your cutoff. If the price p is then less than
your estimate, you will get the service and will expect to earn more money in total by buying
the service. If the price p is greater than your estimate, you will not buy the service which is
a good thing because you believe the service would cost more than it earns you (meaning
your total earnings would be lower if you had bought it).
Track B: you will receive one of the two services for free on all questions.
Track C: you will not receive any of the services nor will you pay for them.
You will then proceed to answer the questions a second time with the services that have been
granted to you.
Back  Continue
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Figure A4: WTP Examples
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Example 2:
In the first phase, Hikaru states his cutoffs for question J as $0.32 for the spreadsheet and
$0.74 for the correct answer. In the second phase, Hikaru is assigned to Track B and he gets
the use of a spreadsheet for all of his questions for free. Question J is randomly selected for
payment.
Suppose Hikaru's answer is 40% higher than the correct answer. Then his earnings
are .
In the first phase, Pavel states his cutoffs for question J as $15.56 for the spreadsheet and
$15.56 for the correct answer. In the second phase, Pavel is assigned to Track C and he does
not get either service for any of his questions. Question J is randomly selected for payment.
Suppose Pavel's answer is 6% higher than the correct answer. Then his earnings are
.
Notice that, for both Hikaru and Pavel, their cutoffs had no effect on their earnings because they
are in Tracks B and C. Thus they have no incentive to lie about their true maximum willingness to
pay for these services.
Back  Continue
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Example 3:
In the first phase, Montgomery states his cutoffs for question J as $6.17 for the spreadsheet
and $8.94 for the correct answer. Montgomery is assigned to Track A in the second phase. It
is determined that the spreadsheet is available. The random price for the spreadsheet comes
out to be $15.03. 
Since this is above $6.17, Montgomery does not get the spreadsheet for question J
nor does he pay anything for it. 
Question J is randomly selected for payment. Suppose Montgomery’s answer is 35%
lower than the correct answer. Then his earnings are 
Now suppose Christine states her cutoffs for question J as $7.73 for the spreadsheet and
$9.00 for the correct answer. Christine is assigned to Track C in the second phase. It is
determined that the correct answer is available. The random price for the answer comes out
to be $0.62. 
Since this is below $9.00, Christine receives the correct answer for question J. 
Question J is randomly selected for payment and thus she is charged $0.62 for the
answer service. Since Christine's answer is exactly correct, her earnings are 25-
0.62=$24.38.
Notice that you are best off truthfully stating the cutoff that makes you indifferent to receiving the
service. There is no advantage to strategic behavior because your cutoff has no effect on the price.
Example 4 illustrates this point.
Back  Continue
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Figure A5: More WTP Examples
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Example 4:
Dianna reads question J and believes that she will lose about $10 from having the wrong answer.
Thus she values the correct-answer service at $10 and is willing to pay $10 for it.
Suppose she honestly states her cutoff. If the price p is below $10 then she will get the
service and pay $p, earning 25-p>15. If the price p is above $10 then she does not purchase
it and earns $15. 
Suppose that she lies about her true cutoff and states that it is y>$10. If the price of the
service is below $10, then she purchases it and earns the same amount as if she had stated
her real cutoff. If the price is above $10 but below y, however, she will end up buying the
service and earning 25-y < $15. In this case, she could have earned more by stating her real
cutoff and not paying too much for the service.
Finally, suppose she lies about her cutoff and says that it is z<$10. If the price for the service
is above $z but below $10, she does not purchase it even though it could have increased her
expected earnings.
Suppose you thought that you would make $15.50 more from having access to the spreadsheet
service. What cutoff would maximize your expected earnings? 
Back  Continue
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Figure A6: WTP Elicitation
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Asset A
has an initial value of $90 and grows
at an interest rate of 25% each period
Asset B
has an initial value of $X, and does
not grow
What number X equalizes the value of:
The value of the assets should be
equal after: 10  periods.
Give your initial estimate of X: 
In the second part of this study, you may have the opportunity to purchase tools which can
help improve your answer, and therefore your payoff. The availabilty of these tools is random, and
at most one will be available to you.
Please indicate the maximum you would spend to buy assistance for this question: if the
randomly-determined price p is below your cutoff, you will pay p from your earnings and receive
the assistance.
I will pay no more for a spreadsheet than: 
I will pay no more for the correct answer than: 
Next
Remember, if this question is selected for payment then your earnings will be given by the
formula , where  is your response and  is the correct value of X. If you are
given the chance to purchase one of the tools, then we will subtract the price of that tool from this
amount. All negative payments will be treated as zero. For your reference:
If your answer is this far from the correct value v: Then you will earn:
0% $25.00
5% $24.75
10% $24.00
15% $22.75
20% $21.00
25% $18.75
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Figure A7: Control Group
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Asset A
has an initial value of $90 and grows
at an interest rate of 25% each period
Asset B
has an initial value of $X, and does
not grow
What number X equalizes the value of:
The value of the assets should be
equal after: 10  periods.
Please indicate the value of X which equalizes the assets after the indicated number of periods: 
Note:Your answer to this question may be randomly drawn for payment based on its accuracy.
Next
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Figure A8: Spreadsheet Treatment
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Asset A
has an initial value of $90 and grows
at an interest rate of 25% each period
Asset B
has an initial value of $X, and does
not grow
What number X equalizes the value of:
The value of the assets should be
equal after: 10  periods.
Please indicate the value of X which equalizes the assets after the indicated number of periods: 
Note:Your answer to this question may be randomly drawn for payment based on its accuracy.
Open spreadsheet  Next
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Figure A9: Answer Treatment
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Asset A
has an initial value of $90 and grows
at an interest rate of 25% each period
Asset B
has an initial value of $X, and does
not grow
What number X equalizes the value of:
The value of the assets should be
equal after: 10  periods.
Please indicate the value of X which equalizes the assets after the indicated number of periods: 
Note:Your answer to this question may be randomly drawn for payment based on its accuracy.
The answer is 838.19.
Next
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